Baxter Sigma Spectrum Infusion Pumps (Update A)
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- CVSS v3 8.6
- ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low skill level to exploit
- Vendor: Baxter
- Equipment: Sigma Spectrum Infusion Pumps
- Vulnerabilities: Use of Hard-coded Password, Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Data, Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource, Operation on a Resource After Expiration or Release
2. UPDATE INFORMATION
This updated advisory is a follow-up to the original advisory titled ICSA-20-170-04 Sigma Spectrum Infusion Pumps that was published June 18, 2020, on the ICS webpage on us-cert.gov.
3. RISK EVALUATION
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in access to sensitive data, alteration of system configuration, and impact to system availability.
4. TECHNICAL DETAILS
4.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS
The following versions of Sigma Spectrum Infusion systems, are affected:
- Sigma Spectrum v6.x model 35700BAX
- Baxter Spectrum v8.x model 35700BAX2
- Sigma Spectrum v6.x with Wireless Battery Modules v9, v11, v13, v14, v15, v16, v20D29, v20D30, v20D31, and v22D24
- Baxter Spectrum v8.x with Wireless Battery Modules v17, v20D29, v20D30, v20D31, and v22D24
- Baxter Spectrum Wireless Battery Modules v17, v20D29, v20D30, v20D31, and v22D24
- Baxter Spectrum LVP v8.x with Wireless Battery Modules v17, v20D29, v20D30, v20D31, and v22D24
4.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW
Sigma Spectrum Infusion System Version(s) 6.x (model 35700BAX) and Baxter Spectrum Infusion System Version(s) 8.x (model 35700BAX2) contain hard-coded passwords which, when physically entered on the keypad, provide access to biomedical menus that include device settings, view of calibration values, and network configuration of the Sigma Spectrum Wireless Battery Module (WBM) if installed.
Sigma Spectrum Infusion System Version(s) 6.x (model 35700BAX) and Baxter Spectrum Infusion System Version(s) 8.x (model 35700BAX2) at the application layer uses an unauthenticated clear-text communication channel to send and receive system status and operational data. This could allow an attacker that has circumvented network security measures to view sensitive non-private data or to perform a man-in-the-middle attack.
The Baxter Spectrum WBM (v17, v20D29, v20D30, v20D31, and v22D24) when used in conjunction with a Baxter Spectrum v8.x (model 35700BAX2), operates a Telnet service on Port 1023 with hard-coded credentials.
The Baxter Spectrum WBM (v17, v20D29, v20D30, v20D31, and v22D24) telnet Command-Line Interface, grants access to sensitive data stored on the WBM that permits temporary configuration changes to network settings of the WBM, and allows the WBM to be rebooted. Temporary configuration changes to network settings are removed upon reboot.
The Baxter Spectrum WBM (v17, v20D29, v20D30, v20D31, and v22D24), when used with a Baxter Spectrum v8.x (model 35700BAX2) in a factory-default wireless configuration enables an FTP service with hard-coded credentials.
The Baxter Spectrum WBM (v17, v20D29, v20D30, v20D31, and v22D24) when configured for wireless networking the FTP service operating on the WBM remains operational until the WBM is rebooted.
- CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS: Healthcare and Public Health
- COUNTRIES/AREAS DEPLOYED: United States
- COMPANY HEADQUARTERS LOCATION: United States
Baxter Healthcare has reported these vulnerabilities to CISA.
Baxter recommends ensuring appropriate physical controls within user environments to protect against unauthorized access to devices.
Baxter recommends isolating the Spectrum Infusion Systems to its own network VLAN to segregate the system from other hospital systems, and reduce the probability that a threat actor could execute an adjacent attack such as a MiTM attack against the system to observe clear-text communications.
Baxter recommends using appropriate wireless network security protocols (WPA2, EAP-TLS, etc.) to provide authentication/encryption of wireless data sent to/from the Spectrum Infusion System.
Users should ensure the WBM is rebooted after configuration for their network(s) by removing the WBM from the rear of the Spectrum device for 10-15 seconds, and then re-attaching the WBM.
Users should always monitor for and/or block unexpected traffic, such as FTP, at network boundaries into the Spectrum-specific VLAN.
As a last resort, users may disable wireless operation of the pump. The Spectrum Infusion System was designed to operate without network access. This action would impact an organization’s ability to rapidly deploy drug library (formulary) updates to their pumps.
——— Begin Update A Part 1 of 1 ———
For additional information please see the Baxter Product Security Bulletin.
——— End Update A Part 1 of 1 ———
CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Specifically, users should:
- Monitor and log all network traffic attempting to reach the affected products, to include Port 20/FTP, Port 21/FTP, and Port 23/TELNET.
- Isolate the affected products from the Internet and all untrusted systems.
- Follow good network hygiene to include appropriate network segmentation, utilizing DMZs and properly configured firewalls.
CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.
CISA also provides a section for control systems security recommended practices on the ICS webpage on us-cert.gov. Several recommended practices are available for reading and download, including Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies.
Additional mitigation guidance and recommended practices are publicly available on the ICS webpage on us-cert.gov in the Technical Information Paper, ICS-TIP-12-146-01B–Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies.
Organizations observing any suspected malicious activity should follow their established internal procedures and report their findings to CISA for tracking and correlation against other incidents.
No known public exploits specifically target these vulnerabilities.